

GREEK METAPHORS OF LIGHT

SIGHT, and its object light, appear to be universal metaphors in human language, both for intellectual apprehension or activity and its objects and also for the experience of aesthetic and moral values. The figure is applied equally to the course or end of a rational approach to knowledge, giving scarcely-felt imagery like 'I see', 'look into', etc., or to a pictorially described 'illumination' or 'vision' that lies beyond the range of reason. Some phrases are applicable in both senses; to 'see the light' may connote either logical grasp of a fact or religious conversion.

The development of some uses of the metaphor may be traced in Greek writers of the classical period, and the study is perhaps worth making, if only in brief outline.

In Homer some recurring expressions show that the line between literal and figurative meaning is not easy to draw. Such are phrases in which either the body's or the mind's eye 'sees' danger or trouble in some form approaching.

Il. 20. 481, *πρόσθ' ὁρώων θάνατον.*

Il. 18. 250, *ὁ γὰρ οἶος ὄρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.*

Cf. *Od.* 24. 452; *Il.* 1. 343, the same phrase with *νοῆσαι* (see below); *Il.* 3. 109–10, with *λεύσσει*.

λεύσσω can introduce an object-clause, with the same ambiguity of meaning, or a question, with the sense of considering a plan.

Il. 1. 120, *λεύσσετε γὰρ τό γε πάντες, ὃ μοι γέρας ἔρχεται ἄλλη.*

Il. 3. 110, *λεύσσει, ὅπως ὄχ' ἄριστα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται.*

But for the sense of pondering or contriving *μερμηρίζω* and *ὀρμαίνω* are more frequent.

σκέπτομαι, correlative of *σκοπῶ* which becomes one of the commonest words in figurative use, appears to be always literal in Homer.

ὄσσομαι has characteristically the figurative sense of seeing with the mind's eye, whether in present imagination or in foreboding.

Od. 1. 115, *ὀσσόμενος πατέρ' ἐσθλὸν ἐνὶ φρεσίν.* Cf. *Od.* 20. 81.

Il. 18. 224, *ὄσσοντο γὰρ ἄλγεα θυμῷ.*

Od. 10. 374, *κακὰ δ' ὄσσετο θυμός.* Cf. *Od.* 18. 154.

ὀπίζομαι conveys 'regard' in the sense of respect or awe.

Il. 18. 216, *μητρὸς . . . ὀπίζετ' ἐφετμήν.*

Il. 22. 332, *ἐμέ δ' οὐδὲν ὀπίζεο νόσφιν ἔοντα.*

The confusion between literal and figurative uses is illustrated by *νοῶ*, which later comes to denote specifically intellectual perception. In Homer it frequently means to see in the physical sense, passing on to several metaphorical uses—understand, purpose, contrive—followed by *ὅπως* or an infinitive.

Il. 3. 21–2, *τὸν ὡς ἐνόησεν . . . | ἐρχόμενον.*

Od. 18. 228, *θυμῷ νοέω καὶ οἶδα ἕκαστα.*

Il. 9. 600, *μή μοι ταῦτα νόει φρεσί.*

Il. 10. 224–5, *πρὸ δ' τοῦ ἐνόησεν, | ὅπως κέρδος ἔη.*

Od. 11. 62–63, *οὐκ ἐνόησα | . . . καταβῆναι.*

φαίνω and φαίνομαι take a number of figurative or semi-figurative meanings.

Od. 8. 499, φαῖνε δ' αἰοδήν.

Il. 7. 325, ἀρίστη φαίνεται βουλή.

Od. 4. 519, ὅτε . . . ἐφαίνεται νόστος.

While the verbs show in Homer this variety of usage, the noun φάος has one distinctive figurative sense, that of salvation or help.

Il. 6. 6, φάως δ' ἐτάροισιν ἔθηκεν.

Also occasionally of a person—pride or comfort.

Od. 16. 23, Τηλέμαχε, γλυκερὸν φάος.

σκότος can be semi-figurative of the darkness of death.

Il. 4. 461, τὸν δὲ σκότος ὅσσε κάλυψεν.

σκότιος appears once as equivalent to νόθος.

Il. 6. 24, σκότιον δέ ἐ γείνατο μήτηρ.

λαμπρός, later figurative in a distinctive use, is only literal in Homer.

With Pindar the metaphor of light is very frequent in one usage, as applied to the radiant distinction or fame of a person or object. There do not seem to be many instances of subjective use of verbs of sight to denote mental perception.

The most characteristic words are φάος, φέγγος, ἀγλαός, λαμπρός, λάμπω, φλέγομαι.

Pyth. 8. 96–97, ὅταν αἶγλα διόσδοτος ἔλθῃ, | λαμπρὸν φέγγος ἔπεσιν.

Ol. 2. 53–56, πλοῦτος . . . | ἀστήρ ἀρίζηλος, ἐτυμώτατον | ἀνδρὶ φέγγος.

Nem. 3. 83–84, τίν γε μέν . . . δέδορκεν φάος.

Pyth. 11. 45, εὐφροσύνα τε καὶ δόξ' ἐπιφλέγει.

Isth. 1. 22, λάμπει δὲ σαφὴς ἀρετά.

Fr. 99 b 3, 'Ησυχίας τὸ φαιδρὸν φάος.

φάος is also used of a person, as in Homer.

Isth. 2. 17, ἄνδρα . . . Ἀκραγαντίνων φάος.

σκότος and cognate words are by contrast used to convey the disgrace of obscurity, failure, neglect, or deception.

Ol. 1. 83, ἐν σκότῳ καθήμενος.

Nem. 7. 61, σκοτεινὸν ἀπέχων ψόγον.

Nem. 7. 12–14, μεγάλα . . . ἀλκαὶ | σκότον . . . ὕμνων ἔχοντι δεόμεναι.

Nem. 8. 32–34, ἐχθρὰ . . . | ἃ τὸ μὲν λαμπρὸν βιάται, | τῶν δ' ἀφάντων κύδος ἀντείνει σαθρόν.

τυφλός is found in the sense of mental blindness to the right course or to true worth.

Isth. 5. 56, οὔτοι τετύφλωται μακρὸς | μόχθος ἀνδρῶν.

Nem. 7. 23–24, τυφλὸν δ' ἔχει | ἥτορ ὄμιλος ἀνδρῶν ὁ πλεῖστος. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἔ τὰν ἀλάθειαν ἰδέμεν, κτλ.

Sir Maurice Bowra,¹ writing on the Proem of Parmenides, stresses the implication in Pindar's imagery of truth as an integral part of glory and fame. Both

¹ *Problems in Greek Poetry*, pp. 38 ff.

Pindar and Parmenides, he argues, 'regard knowledge as a kind of enlightenment, ignorance as a kind of darkness' (p. 41). He quotes *Nem.* 7. 12-14 as typical of these meanings, and argues that the metaphor of Light (Darkness in relation to knowledge starts from the period of these two writers. It must be allowed that the sense of 'being known' is often present in words like *λαμπρός*, but the idea of 'brightness' confronting the mind's eye is surely more essential. The imagery is strongly visual, and the real parallel to Pindar's language is found rather in those passages (e.g.) of the *Phaedrus*¹ where Plato uses terms from the Mysteries, or in his description of the Good as *τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον*,² than in the development of language applied to the subjective experience of the approach to knowledge. In Parmenides' Proem, as Bowra rightly says, 'the transition from Night to Day is the transition from ignorance to knowledge'.³ There is, however, little or nothing to be found in the fragments of further use of the metaphor of light in either a subjective or an objective application.

The tradition that Heraclitus from the obscurity of his sayings was called *ὁ σκοτεινός* appears first in the Aristotelian *De Mundo* 396^b20, but may well come from a much earlier date. *σκοτεινός* and cognate words become established in prose usage to connote obscurity or deceit.

Plato, *Rep.* 558 d, *ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα.*

Laus 864 c, *μετὰ σκότους καὶ ἀπάτης.*

Aeschin. 2. 34, *σκοτεινὸν προοίμιον.*

The pre-Socratic philosophers themselves do not appear to contribute anything to our inquiry.

With the tragic writers some of the characteristic Homeric and Pindaric imagery recurs, with bold metaphors especially in choric passages. In dialogue, usages appear which become familiar in prose. Light connotes salvation, glory, virtue, also certainty and truth. *λαμπρός* and *φῶς* are frequent, and both may be applied to persons. Verbs of sight may also convey perception of fact, provision, precaution.

Aesch. *Pers.* 150-1, *ἥδε θεῶν ἴσον ὀφθαλμοῖς | φάος ὀρμάται μήτηρ βασιλέως.*

Ag. 389, *πρέπει δέ, φῶς αἰνολαμπές, σίνος.*

772, *Δίκα δὲ λάμπει . . . ἐν δυσκάπνοις δώμασιν.*

Cho. 809, *ἐλευθερίας φῶς λαμπρὸν ἰδεῖν.*

Eum. 797, *λαμπρὰ μαρτύρια.*

Soph. *El.* 66, *ἐχθροῖς ἄστρον ὥς λάμψειν.*

Ant. 599-600, *νῦν γὰρ . . . | ἐτέτατο φάος ἐν Οἰδίου δόμοις.*

Trach. 1174, *ταῦτ' . . . λαμπρὰ συμβαίνειν.*

Eur. *El.* 37, *λαμπροὶ . . . ἐς γένος.*

Or. 243-4, *ἦκει φῶς ἐμοῖς . . . κακοῖς | ἀνῆρ.*

Suppl. 324-5, *αἱ δ' ἥσυχαι σκοτεινὰ πράσσουσιν πόλεις | σκοτεινὰ καὶ βλέπουσιν εὐλαβούμεναι.*

Characteristic of tragedy (also occasional in Homer) are those mixed metaphors for which W. B. Stanford⁴ adopts the term *intersensual*, as 'catachrestic uses of verbs meaning 'to see' or 'to hear' for the general sensuous term 'to perceive'".

¹ *Phaedrus* 249-50.

² *Republic* 540a.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁴ *Greek Metaphor*, pp. 47 ff.

Examples importing words of sight :

Od. 8. 499, φαῖνε δ' αἰοιδήν.

Aesch. Pers. 395, σάλπιγξ δ' αὐτῇ πάντ' ἐκεῖν' ἐπέφλεγεν.

Soph. Trach. 693, δέρκομαι φάτιν.

O.T. 186, παῖδ' ἀνδ' ἀλάμπευ.

El. 1410, ἰδοὺ μάλ' αὖ θροεῖ τις.

Eur. El. 1039, ὁ ψόγος λαμπρύνεται.

While in some instances (e.g. *Aesch. Pers.* 395) the combination gives great vividness of effect, in most the general sense of perception appears to be superseding the proper meaning of the words of sight.

Euripides in one or two examples suggests a conscious correlation of the visual with the intellectual faculty.

Eur. Hel. 122, αὐτὸς γὰρ ὅσσοις εἰδόμην· καὶ νοῦς ὄρῳ.

Phoen. 463-4, ἐφ' οἷσιν ἦκει, ταῦτα χρή μόνον σκοπεῖν, | κακῶν δὲ τῶν πρὶν μηδενὸς μνείαν ἔχειν.

The use of verbs of sight, chiefly ὄρῳ, to connote knowledge, provision, precaution, etc., is found mainly in dialogue passages, with various constructions, and is specially characteristic of Sophocles. On a rough count, Aeschylus gives 14 such examples in 7 plays, Sophocles 38 in 7, Euripides 43 in 20.

Aesch. P.V. 259, οὐχ ὄρῳσ' ὅτι | ἤμαρτες;

Eum. 269, ὄψη δὲ κεῖ τις ἄλλος ἦλινεν.

Soph. Trach. 706, ὄρῳ δέ μ' ἔργον δεινὸν ἐξεργασμένην.

Aj. 1313, ὄρα μὴ τοῦμόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σόν.

Ant. 1270, τὴν δίκην ἰδεῖν.

Phil. 519, ὄρα . . . μὴ . . . εὐχερὴς παρήσ.

Eur. Hipp. 379, τῇδ' ἀθρητέον τόδε.

I.A. 674, χρή τό γ' εὐσεβὲς σκοπεῖν.

Trö. 931, τὸν ἔνθεν δ' ὥς ἔχει σκέψαι λόγον.

As against the weakening metaphor in verbs like ὄρῳ and σκοπῶ, the use of βλέπω and its compounds is found in a figurative (or semi-figurative) sense of appealing for help or consideration, or again regarding a standard. The usage (mainly with ἐς or πρὸς) seems most frequent with Euripides.

Soph. El. 958-9, ἐς τίν' ἐλπιδῶν | βλέψας' . . . ;

Eur. Med. 247, πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βλέπειν.

I.T. 928, τὸ δ' Ἄργος πρὸς σὲ νῦν ἀποβλέπει.

Andr. 404, πρὸς τί χρή βλέπειν;

With the prose writers of the fifth and fourth centuries the use of σκοπεῖν or ὄραν to denote intellectual perception or inquiry becomes confirmed, especially in passages of direct speech, with the addition of compounds such as προορᾶν or ἐνορᾶν, and often in close conjunction with words of thinking.

Hdt. 1. 120, σέο . . . προοπτέον ἐστί. . . εἰ φοβερόν τι ἐνωρῶμεν . . .

Thuc. 1. 10, ἀπιστεῖν . . . σκοπεῖν . . . νομίζειν . . .

Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 40, σκέψασθε εἰ . . . μέγα φρονητέον.

Dem. Lept. 54, πάλοι . . . ἐσκέφθαι ταῦτα καὶ ἐγνώσθαι προσῆκεν.

Examples of 'intersensual' metaphor are also found.

Dem. Ol. 3. 1, ὅταν . . . ἀποβλέψω . . . πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὗς ἀκούω.

Plato's uses of the metaphor of light are repeated and various. It appears constantly in the subjective application, signifying by a verb (most frequently σκοπῶ) the use of the mind's eye to 'look into' a matter under discussion. Typically it is Socrates who uses the figure in leading an inquiry, often with an imperative or hortatory subjunctive. Instances are very frequent in passages of close investigation, as in *Meno*, parts of *Phaedo*, and *Theaetetus*. A few examples from *Meno* will serve.

Meno 82c, ὧδε δὲ σκόπει.

87b, ὑποθέμενοι . . . σκοπῶμεν.

87d, δοκεῖ . . . σκεπτέον εἶναι.

78c, ἴδωμεν . . . τοῦτο εἰ ἀληθὲς λέγεις.

82a, οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέψας εἶπον.

The metaphor of blindness is sometimes correlated with sight in this application to thought.

Gorg. 479b, κινδυνεύουσι . . . τὸ ἀλγεινὸν . . . καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν κτλ.

Phaedo 96c, ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθη, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον κτλ.

Theaet. 174e, ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν ὁρώντων, οὐ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν καὶ λογίζεσθαι κτλ.

So far, Plato uses imagery already established in prose usage, and often little felt. But with βλέπω and ἀποβλέπω, in particular, he brings in stronger metaphors following in part the usages of tragedy.

Gorg. 507d, ὁ σκοπὸς . . . πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν.

Rep. 484c, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κτλ.

Similes of this kind, referring to the painter's work, are frequent in the *Republic* 377e, 500e–501c, 504d, 540c, etc.

Cf. *Theaet.* 187a, b, ὅρα . . . πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾶς.

Tim. 26c, ἀκουόμενα . . . οἶον ἐγκαύματα ἀνεκπλύτου γραφῆς ἔμμονά μοι γέγονεν.

Laws 769a, καθάπερ ζωγράφων . . . ἡ πραγματεία κτλ.

The outstanding application of the metaphor in Plato's thought is found in his description of the Form as παράδειγμα, with particulars as εἰκόνες or μιμήματα.

Parm. 132d, τὰ μὲν εἶδη . . . ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦτοις εὐκείναι κτλ.

As so far illustrated, Plato's metaphors of light are used to denote the standpoint of the percipient subject. In another type of application they convey the quality of the object contemplated, and show much affinity with earlier and poetic imagery.

In *Republic* 6–7, where the metaphor dominates, the two applications are combined. In the Sun parable, sight connotes knowledge, the sun and its light truth and supreme value. Words from the poets carry a strong emotional meaning.

Rep. 478c, δόξα is described as γνώσεως μὲν σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον. 506c, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά contrasted with φανὰ τε καὶ καλά.

The distinction developed in this passage between *ὁρατά* and *νοητά* illustrates how completely *νοῶ* and its cognates have passed from the Homeric sense of 'see' to the characteristic meaning 'think'.

Amid the elaborate imagery of the Sun and the Cave allegories (separated by the Line, itself an appeal to the visual faculty), one or two rather strange inconsistencies remain. Plato appears to disregard, in order to maintain the analogy with intellectual perception of the Good, the impossibility of the Sun's being directly regarded by the human eye. If we in our atmosphere are aware of this limitation, he must have been yet more so; and in fact there are passages elsewhere in which by implication he admits it.

Phaedo 99 d, e, οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι . . . διαφθείρονται τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι . . . σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ.

Here, whatever the philosophical interpretation, it is clearly suggested that to look directly at the sun, even in eclipse, is unwise.

Laus 897d, μὴ . . . ἐξ ἐναντίας οἶον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νύκτα ἐν μεσημβρία ἐπαγόμενοι, ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν . . . πρὸς δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου βλέποντας ἀσφαλέστερον ὁρᾶν.

But in the *Republic* he ignores the difficulty, after once saying that it is easier for the unaccustomed eye to see *first* shadows, reflections, and the like.

516b, τελευταῖον δὴ . . . τὸν ἥλιον . . . αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτόν . . . δύναιτ' ἂν κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν.

532a, ἀποβλέπειν . . . πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον.

Another incongruity in this passage appears in the introduction of the fire in the Cave. A fire may be expected to flame and flicker, but this one by implication merely glows. The movement of the shadows on the back wall is supplied by the action of the invisible bearers, and there is no suggestion of an unstable light contributing to the illusions which are rife within the Cave. Presumably the intention is to keep exact here, as in the parallelism of the whole passage, the continuous proportion Fire : Sun : Good.

In conveying, though never defining, the apprehension of the Good, Plato's visual imagery varies between the simple metaphor of sight and language which carries poetic and emotional effect.

517 b, c, φαίνεται . . . ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι.

But 518a, ἐκ φανότερου βίου ἤκουσα.

518c, στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους . . . εἰς τοῦ ὄντος φανότατον.

540a, ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλινάστας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ κτλ.

Two passages in other dialogues carry the same poetic atmosphere in reference to the soul's experience of the Forms. In *Symp.* 210 ff. the language is throughout that of sight, literal and obvious when the starting-point is the perception of visual beauty, but becoming metaphorical as the process goes forward.

Symp. 210c, θεάσασθαι τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν . . . καὶ βλέπων πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλὸν . . . ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν . . . ἕως ἂν . . . κατίδῃ τινὰ ἐπιστήμην . . . ἣ ἐστὶ καλοῦ τοιοῦδε . . . 210c, ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν.

Here the imagery of sight is consistent. Perhaps the nearest counterpart to the dramatic effect of ἐξαίφνης is the passage in *Eph.* 7. 341c, ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας . . . ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον κτλ.

In the *Phaedrus* the prenatal experience recovered by ἀνάμνησις (a concept not found in the *Republic*) is again conveyed by the imagery of sight. The reality envisaged is (247c) ἡ . . . ἀχρώματος τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία . . . ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνῳ θεατῇ νῶ. The characteristic words of sight here used are καθορᾶν and θεᾶσθαι, and they are combined with terms associated with the Mysteries.

Phaedr. 248b, ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας.

250a, λήθην ὧν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν.

250b, δικαιοσύνης . . . οὐκ ἔνεστι φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῆδε ὁμοιώμασιν . . . κάλλος δὲ τότ' ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε . . . μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν . . . εἶδον . . . ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ.

κάλλος is the outstanding Form, as the object of ἔρως, and is vividly described—250d, ἔλαμπεν . . . στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. But the metaphor covers all the Forms of being.

The language of this passage raises unsolved questions, regarding Plato's attitude to the Mysteries, the supra-rational experience of the Forms that is here implied, and the further problem of ἀνάμνησις, whether itself a metaphor or an article of genuine belief. No less surely the visual imagery pervading the whole carries the mind's eye back to the radiant world of Pindar.

The metaphor of light in its various uses comes to full fruition in Plato; from him it passes through post-classical writers to Plotinus, and continues to inform the language of European reasoning and mysticism alike. In Greek of the classical period its further use follows the accepted lines in application to mental activity.

Aristotle develops in particular the use of θεωρεῖν, more common with him than σκοπεῖν, in the sense of mental contemplation.

Pol. A. 5. 1254^a20, τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι.

De An. A. 402^a7, θεωρῆσαι καὶ γινῶναι τὴν φύσιν [τῆς ψυχῆς].

In the intransitive use the verb and its cognates denote active thought.

De An. B. 412^a21–22, σώματος ἐντελέχεια . . . λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν.

Eth. Nic. A. 1095^b19, ὁ [βίος] θεωρητικός.

A few more picturesque uses of the metaphor are found.

Eth. Nic. A. 1114^b6, φῶναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς.

Eth. Nic. A. 1100^b30, διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν.

Rhet. Γ. 1411^b12—a metaphor of unknown origin, quoted as illustrating a point of analogy: καὶ ὅτι “τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνῆψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ”. ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι.